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The protracted economic crisis that plaque Nigeria since the early 1980s has 
impacted negatively on the well-being of youth in the country. The situation 
is further exacerbated by the high incidence of state failure and the crisis of 
governance, characterised by the massive deterioration of government 
institutions, pervasive poverty, corruption and the near total collapse of 
moral and ethical standards in the country. This has occasioned the 
worsening and continued deterioration of the socio-economic condition of 
youth thereby, creating a myriad of problems ranging from poverty, 
unemployment, drug and substance abuse, family disintegration, crime, 
violence, frustration and despair. While several attempts have been made to 
solve youth problems in Nigeria, the outcomes of these initiatives have been 
sub-optimal, as most existing policies designed to empower youth are borne 
out of ‘moral panicky’ measures, rather than being genuinely geared towards 
solving the problem. These policies emanate more out of fear of the negative 
consequences of youth responses to their poor situation, than in 
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fundamentally addressing the factors responsible for the situation. The good 
governance option thus, becomes imperative; owing to the prominence it 
accords structures and processes in achieving outcomes. Its propensity to 
generate trust and reciprocity in the exercise of authority facilitates order, 
stability and continuity in state-society interaction that in turn guarantees the 
sustainability of these outcomes in the long-run. Utilizing secondary data, the 
study examines the nature and causes of the deteriorating conditions of youth 
socio-economic situation in Nigeria. It also explores the option of good 
governance as a panacea, with particular emphasis on active youth 
participation in policy initiatives, accountability, transparency and effective 
service delivery. 
 Introduction 
The protracted economic crisis that plagued Nigeria since the early 1980s, 
characterised by a decline in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate, 
Balance of Payment deficits, high cost of production, occasioned by the poor 
implementation of the various development plans and acute mismanagement 
of the country’s abundant material resources, led to a significant increase in 
lending rates, prevalence of unviable State-owned enterprises, multiple 
taxes\levies, depreciation of the local currency, debt burden, e.t.c., that 
invariably, impacted negatively on the well-being of the vast majority of the 
population, with the youth being the worst hit. The situation is further 
exacerbated by the high incidence of state failure and the crisis of 
governance, which is manifested by the massive deterioration of government 
institutions, pervasive poverty, corruption and the near total collapse of moral 
and ethical standards in the country. 
The attendant implication of the above situation was the worsening and 
continued deterioration of the socio-economic predicament of the youth. This 
gave rise to a myriad of problems ranging from poverty, unemployment, drug 
and substance abuse, family disintegration, crime, violence, frustration and 
despair. While several attempts have been made to address youth related 
problems in Nigeria, the outcomes of these initiatives have been sub-optimal, 
as most existing policies designed for this purpose were borne out of ‘moral 
panicky’ measures. Specifically, these policies emanate more out of the fear 
of the negative consequences of youth responses to their poor situation, than 
in fundamentally addressing the factor responsible for their poor socio-
economic predicaments. 
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This study, therefore, examines the nature and causes of the deteriorating 
conditions of youth socio-economic situation in Nigeria, and explores the 
option of good governance as a panacea, with particular emphasis on active 
youth participation in policy initiatives, accountability, transparency and 
effective service delivery.  
The concept of youth 
The debate on who is a ‘youth’ has continued to generate a lot of interest and 
controversy that does not seem resolvable any time soon. As the concept of 
‘youth’ has been understood and used differently by both  scholars, 
development practioners, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 
Development Organizations,  International Organizations, the public and 
Governments alike (Mkandawire, 1996). The word ‘youth’ has different 
meanings depending on the context within which it is being used. The term 
youth is sometimes used as a statistical artefact to refer specifically to those 
aged 15-24 years. This is done for ease of comparison, as it is this age 
grouping for which data are available (World Youth Report, 2003:3). 
However, this designation is often too narrow when young people and their 
circumstances are considered on an individual country basis. Another 
meaning used in discussion of policy response of Governments to the 
particular problem faced by young people, is based on a sociological 
definition of youth as a transition “from adolescence to adulthood, from 
dependence to independence, and from being recipients of services to 
becoming contributors to national economic, political and cultural life” 
(Ibid). As such, Kenniston (1971) argues that the word youth refers to a 
period between adolescence and adulthood in the post-modern era. To Berger 
(1972), anyone who feels youthful, and exhibits such qualities as spontaneity, 
impulsiveness, energy and so forth is a youth. In most African countries, laws 
define ‘adulthood’ as commencing from the age of 21 years, although in 
recent times there has been attempt to lower this age to 18 years (Curtain, 
2000). However, for most countries, 21 years still remains the age at which 
many of the activities and responsibilities of ‘adulthood is assumed legally. 
Sociologically, ‘youth’ denotes an interface between ‘childhood and 
‘adulthood’. However, in the case of many rural African societies, the status 
of ‘adulthood’ is largely determined by the capacity to sustain a ‘legal’ 
marriage. As Abdullah (1999) rightly observes, that in countries like Mali, 
Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Guinea, ‘adulthood is defined as the 
capacity to sustain a marriage. As such, those who are not married, whatever 
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their chronological age, are still regarded as ‘children’. Hence, it is not 
uncommon to find a 12 year old girl who, by virtue of being married, will be 
considered an ‘adult’, while an unmarried 40 year old man will still be 
considered a ‘youth’ or ‘child’ (Chigunta, 2002). 
In an attempt to ‘standardise’ youth programmes, international organizations 
have come up with specific age categories to define a youth. For instance, the 
United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs uses the age 
category 18-24 years to define a ‘youth’ (cited in Abe, 2007), while the 
Commonwealth uses the age category 15-29 years and the African Union 
uses the category of 15-34 years. Most African countries have either adopted 
the United Nations or Commonwealth definition. In Nigeria, the National 
Youth Development Policy, defines the youth as ‘comprising all young 
persons of ages 18 to 30 who are citizens of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’ 
(FGN, 2001). For analytical purposes, this paper adopts this age category as 
the definition of youth, as anybody who is above the age of 30 years is 
exempted from the compulsory National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) 
scheme. 
Nigerian economic crisis: implication on youth socio-economic situation 
In the early years of Nigeria’s political independence, the agricultural sector 
played a significant role in the country’s economy, with agriculture 
accounting for at least 65% of the country’s GDP. However, with the 
discovery oil, and the attendant oil boom of the 1970s, which saw Nigeria’s 
revenue earnings from crude oil raising from a mere $367 million in 1969, to 
$713 million in 1970, to a phenomenal $1337 million in 1971 (Mimiko, 
1998:170), crude oil became the main-stay of the economy. By 1973, 
earnings from crude oil had risen to $2878 million, jumping to an 
unprecedented $8513 million in 1974 (Ibid). This increase in oil revenue 
occasioned a proportional increase in government’s intervention in the 
economy, as well as the provision of social services, such that many public 
projects were undertaken without requisite analysis of their long-term 
financial viability. By the late 1970s, when the indigenisation decree was 
promulgated, government’s involvement in the economy had become very 
substantial. Although the indigenisation decree was meant to enhance local 
participation in, and by implication the displacement of foreign interests from 
many sectors of the Nigerian economy (Mimiko, 1995:21), its direct 
consequence was that a lot of companies fell under government control.  
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The increase in oil revenue gave impetus to the government to increase 
public expenditure; government continues to spend the bulk of its annual 
budget on recurrent expenditure, especially on the management of a huge 
bureaucracy with defence being one of the key areas of capital spending 
(Okafor, 2003:2). However, the declining price of commodity products at the 
international market and the fall in oil price noticeable around the same 
period adversely affected the country’s foreign earnings and necessitated the 
channelling of a disproportionate percentage of the meagre foreign exchange 
into sustaining its bourgeoning expenditure profile. Because the oil boom 
could not generate enough revenue to keep pace with public expenditure, the 
government was forced to run a deficit budget and increase its borrowing. 
The government in the bid to finance its external and fiscal imbalances 
started incurring debts, depleting foreign reserves, and going into arrears in 
its external commitments (Olaiya and Awe, 2004:20). Nigeria’s indebtedness 
impeded its access to foreign capital, and short-term trade arrears 
accumulated to the point that foreign banks held back on confirming letters 
of credit. The persistent balance of payments deficits recorded by Nigeria, 
came to a head when the country’s foreign reserves reached a precarious 
level in 1982 (Jimoh, 2004:109-130). The Shagari administration in the bid 
the arrest the situation came up with the Economic Stabilization Act of 1982. 
The measures, which were no more than the intensification of import and 
exchange controls that had hitherto been in place (Jimoh, 2007:5), could not 
resolve the crisis, the military, eventually took over in December 1983. 
The new military regime attempted to augment the austerity measures by 
imposing wage freeze on public sector employees, and drastically cutting 
down public expenditure on infrastructures. This however, did not abate the 
crisis, as capacity utilization continue to decline, leading to widespread 
closure of factories and plants. Domestic savings and investment fell while 
external debt service requirements went as high as 34% of exports of goods 
and services in 1985 (Olaiya and Awe, Op.Cit). 
By 1985, the distortions in the economy were severe and varied. The 
exchange rate was still grossly under-valued. Budget deficits were still 
prevalent and import controls were made more stringent. The Babangida 
administration in 1986, adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP), which includes among others, trade liberalization, currency 
devaluation, wage freeze, review of government expenditure (reduction in the 
subsidization of essential services), commercialization and privatization and 
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interest rate liberalization. These measures did not however, have much 
significant impact on the economy, as many sectors of the economy recorded 
low performances. For instance, while the manufacturing sector accounted 
for 9.5% of the GDP in the years 1981 to 1986, the figure nosedived to 6.1% 
in the period 1987 to 1992 (The Guardian, 1993:20-21). Similarly, it was 
observed that between the period 1987 and 1993, 700 manufacturing 
companies out of the 1500 that belong to the Manufacturing Association of 
Nigeria (MAN) closed down as a result of the distortion occasioned by the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (Mimiko, Op.Cit: 31-33). Also, 
investment as a percentage of GDP that was 12.0% between 1981 and 1986 
fell to 6.0% in the SAP years of 1987-1991. Capacity utilization as at June 
1992 was 34.51% as against 42.4% in 1989 (Ibid). 
In relation to the reduction of government budget deficit, rather than reduce, 
fiscal deficit was observed to have increased progressively. In 1988, fiscal 
deficit which stood at N12.2 billion had increased to N23.5 billion in 1990 to 
N35.3 billion in 1991, by 1993, it had reached an all time high of N101 
billion. Official rate of inflation jumped from 7.4% in 1990 to 44.6% in 1992 
to 100% in 1993 (Tell, 1993:13). The country’s debt situation also worsens 
under SAP. Nigeria’s external debt jumped from $18.9 billion or 23.4% of 
GDP in 1985 to $28.9 billion or 113.2% of GDP in 1992. External debt ratio 
that was 147% in 1985 was 232% in 1993 (The Guardian, Op.Cit). The entire 
debt profile rose by some 1,440% between 1986 and 1992. The internal 
environment did not fare better, as domestic debt jumped from N27, 952 
billion in 1985 to N175.20 billion in 1993. 
These crises continued even after the SAP years, and they were further 
exacerbated by the incidences of state failure and the crisis of governance. 
The collapse of the Nigerian State occasioned the deterioration and near total 
collapse of public utilities in the country. Commenting generally on the state 
of public services in Nigeria, Olowu (1996) observed that: 
The country’s public utilities, as a social sector, have 
virtually collapsed. It will be charitable to describe 
the education system as epileptic. It is difficult to say 
whether the public schools are open or closed…state 
hospitals first degenerated from places that provide 
medical care to consulting clinics. Now, places to 
die-alternatives, that is to homes. 
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Water, next to air as the most elementary human need, became scarce, while 
the nation’s roads, highways, bridges, seaports and airports, all degenerated 
to a terrible state, due to neglect and lack of maintenance. Power supply 
became erratic, while the communication sector did not fare better, as the 
quality of services rendered by NITEL and NIPOST, became a subject of 
continuous lamentation by the generality of the people. Added these 
problems, is the crisis of governance that engendered wide-spread corruption 
and the break-down of moral and ethical values in the country.  
By the end of the 1990s, when the country eventually return to “democratic 
governance”, corruption had become so pervasive and endemic that the 
country was rated as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. 
Government business and public life became riddled with inefficiency, 
dishonesty, mediocrity, incompetence, indifference and waste. The attendant 
social problems created by these crises were myriad, with severe negative 
consequences on the socio-economic conditions of the vast majority of the 
population, and youth in particular. For instance, while the poverty rate of the 
overall population in the country increased from 17.7 million in 1980, to 34.7 
million in 1985, 67.1 million in 1996, and well over 70 million in 2004 
(Omotoso, 2004; Oyeranti and Olayiwola, 2005), the poverty rate among the 
youth was put at 26,630 thousand out of the estimated 28,821 thousand in 
2003, representing over 90 percent of the estimated youth population in the 
country (Youth Response, 2003:9).  
In the case of unemployment, studies by the UNDP and ILO using composite 
rate of unemployment and underemployment indicate that “approximately 
21.9 percent of Nigeria’s labour force had unemployment problems in 1998” 
(Okafor, 2003:2), with youth unemployment rate estimated to be four times 
higher than the country’s national average (Egulu, 2004). According to the 
2008 unemployment statistics, it is estimated that as many as 21 million 
Nigerian youth are jobless (Makinde, 2008). The attendant effects of 
deepening poverty and widespread unemployment has considerably 
contributed to the breakdown of traditional value system and social 
institutions (Mlama, 1999), coupled with rapid urbanization that engendered 
rural-urban migration that greatly undermined the traditional kinship 
structures (Bonnell, 2000) has weakened the ability of parents to cater for 
their children, thereby, forcing these children to look for alternatives in order 
to survive, with most of them engaging in menial activities, begging, 
scavenging, prostitution and crime.  
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Furthermore, the disintegration witnessed in public schools in terms of 
quality, infrastructure and the morale of both teachers and students has 
equally contributed to the worsening socio-economic conditions of the youth. 
Educational curriculum at the secondary and tertiary levels in the country 
emphasises more on theoretical knowledge acquisition at the expense of 
practical and vocational skills. As a result of the inability of the educational 
system to equip young people with skills beyond basic literacy and numeracy 
skills, most school leavers were ill-prepared for the practical realities they 
face in a largely stagnated formal sector environment as job seekers. The 
attendant implication of this is that, most young people now perceive formal 
education as being ‘useless’, especially, when they see their friends, brothers, 
sisters and cousins who complete school before them staying for long periods 
at home without gainful or productive employment. This situation has 
occasioned an increase in the rate of school drop-outs by young people, 
especially the male children. 
Several initiatives by the government to arrest the deplorable socio-economic 
conditions of the youth- The National Directorate of Employment (NDE), 
People’s Bank of Nigeria (PBN), Community Banks (CB), Family Support 
Programme (FSP), Family Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP), 
Niger-Delta Development Commission (NDDC), Poverty Alleviation 
Programme (PAP), National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), have 
produced limited outcomes. These attempts have largely been guided by a 
vision that neither addresses the livelihoods needs nor meets the real 
expectations of young people (Momoh, 1998; Nweke, 2005; Yinusa, 2005). 
Rather, the policies were highly politicised and based on stereotypical 
notions of disaffected youth (Schnurr, 1998). Specifically, most of these 
initiatives were prompted by a ‘moral panic’, “mainly because of fears 
arising from the way young people respond to shrinking income and 
opportunities which are interpreted in pathological terms by the authorities” 
(Chigunta Op.Cit:15). 
The general perception have been to see the youth as an immature, impatient, 
inexperience and greedy set of people, who should not be trusted or saddled 
with positions of responsibility.  As such many of the initiatives designed to 
solve youth problem sees the youth as ‘subjects’ rather than the ‘objects’ of 
such initiatives, which has necessitated their marginal involvement and near 
total exclusion in policy agenda. This lack of adequate participation in the 
planning, implementation and evaluation of these initiatives has led to the 
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duplication of programmes, whose scopes are most often unwieldy, thereby 
leading to difficulties in coordination, institutional rivalry and conflicts 
amongst the various agencies involved. Similarly, inadequate funding to 
sustain most of these programmes long enough to allow the benefits 
manifest, has ultimately led to their failure. 
The good governance option 
The sub-optimal outcomes of government’s responses to youth poor socio-
economic situation, encapsulated in the wanton and unbridled exercise of 
power and authority; gross mismanagement of national resources and dismal 
state of infrastructures and social services, makes the good governance option 
very imperative. Governance can be understood in terms of three major 
components. First it denotes the nature or form of political authority existent 
in a country, that is, whether autocratic or democratic; presidential or 
parliamentary. Second, the means through which authority is exercised in the 
management of both human and material resources. Third, the ability of the 
government to discharge its functions in an efficient and equitable manner 
that ensures and guarantees the entrenchment of certain democratic ideals 
such as accountability, transparency, corruption-free, integrity, 
responsiveness and high performance standard among others, through 
effective citizens engagement. 
Governance therefore, involves interactions among structures, processes and 
traditions that determine how power is exercised, how decisions are taken, 
and how citizens or other stakeholders have their way (Plumptre and 
Graham, 1999, p.3). It allows us to discuss the role of government in coping 
with public issues and the contribution that other players may make. It 
facilitates reflections on strategies that may be adopted by a society in 
instances of government’s incapacity. It opens our minds to the possibility 
that groups in society rather than government may have a stronger role in 
addressing problems, which allows for “adaptation and continuous 
improvement of market-oriented systems in a specific socio-economic 
context” (Bratton and Hyden, 1992). This includes advocating and 
demanding accountability and transparency from those in authority, and 
facilitating opportunities for improved service delivery, through effective 
participation.  
Participation involves a search for new, more direct ways through which 
citizens may influence government and hold them accountable (Gaventa and 
Valderrama, 1999: 2). It represents a move from one of users and choosers of 
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services provided by others to one in which people become actors and agents 
in broader processes of governance.  As such: 
Once user groups engage in dialogue with producers 
of public services they enter the territory of public 
service decision-making.  It is at that point that the 
issues of identity and governance come together in 
the tension around the disputed identities of 
“consumer” or “citizen” (Barnes, 1999, p.82).  
 This means that citizens themselves play a role in the process of policy-
making, by proposing policy-options (Gramberger, 2001, p.16).  Active 
youth participation in the policy process facilitates a viable working 
partnership with adults in a mutual and respectable manner. It affords 
opportunities for recognising and nurturing the strengths, abilities and 
interests of young people in evolving decisions that affects them both at the 
individual and collective levels. Since governance involves, “the manner in 
which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and 
social resources for development” (World Bank, 1992, p.3), effective 
participation of young people moves the process beyond reactive and 
prescriptive measures to the level of meaningful stakeholders in the design 
and implementation of policy decisions capable of transforming their socio-
economic situation. As Osamani (2001: 6) rightly comments, “participation 
makes it possible to utilize local people’s knowledge about local conditions 
in solving local problems more efficiently”, Similarly, Fischer, (2000) also 
argues that “citizens have special knowledge that is indispensable for the 
development of practice-oriented, effective, and meaningful solutions to 
problems”. In this sense, participation and genuine partnership involving 
young people, build trust and enhances the potential for sustainable policy 
through broad-based ownership, especially of youth empowerment 
programmes.   
Participation as discussed above represents a key element of governance, by 
building on the insight that citizens can make an active and original 
contribution to policy-making.  It taps into the broader resources of society in 
order to meet the many governance challenges facing societies today.  It 
envisions the role of government not as a micro-manager, but as an enabler 
and provider of frameworks.  Within these frameworks, market and civil 
society, individual citizens and groups may organize their activities and 
relations.  Here, the relationship between government and citizens in policy-
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making can become a partnership that builds trusts and enhances the potential 
for sustainable policy through broad-based ownership. 
Furthermore, effective participation engenders an environment conducive for 
positive and transformational change in perception and attitude of the youths 
towards the structure and process of governance. Such perceptual and 
attitudinal change makes the process of reorientation, re-socialization and 
mobilization of young people easy in the all-important task of nation-
building and national development, thus, empowering them to demand 
accountability and transparency from those in position of authority.  
Conventionally, accountability refers to being answerable for one’s actions or 
behaviour. According to Robertson (1993, p.3), it concerns the process by 
which those who exercise power, whether as governments, as elected 
representatives or as appointed officials, must be able to show that they have 
exercised their powers and discharge their duties properly. Essentially, 
therefore, the idea of accountability is “rooted in the widely shared belief that 
humans are prone to error, and as such subjects of political authority should 
therefore be protected from the hazardous behaviour of their governors” 
(Fontana, 1997, p.1). This requires that public officers and institutions are 
under obligation to submit their activities to scrutiny by the members of the 
public, and by the organs and institutions to carry out such scrutiny 
(Akinseye, 2001).  The need to hold government accountable for decisions 
and actions taken, act upon criticisms or requirement made of them, and 
accept (some) responsibilities of failure, incompetence, or deceit’ (Mclean, 
1996, p.1), reduces inefficiency in resource management, and facilitates 
opportunities for the productive channelling of the energy and creativity of 
young people. Achieving this requires:   
a. Greater responsibility to elected superiors 
b. Greater responsibilities to community groups; and 
c. Greater commitment to value and higher standard of morality 
(Adakai, 1998:113). 
Transparency on the other hand, requires that governments consult broadly to 
ascertain citizen interests, publicize plans and decisions, share information 
widely and in good time, and consistently act in an open manner (Centre for 
Democracy and Governance, 2000: 1). It is about the provision of 
information, which has to be objective, complete, relevant, easy to find, and 
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easy to understand (Caddy, 2001:2), in relation to the conduct of public 
affairs and public transactions, through the exercise of the right to know 
(Sorabjee, 2001: 1-2). Transparency emphasizes government’s tolerance of 
youth active engagement in public debate, scrutiny and public questioning of 
political, economic and social policy choices, affecting them in particular, 
and society in general. 
Lastly, a viable governance environment guarantees effective service 
delivery. As De Groot (2003), notes, service delivery involves service 
improvement… that ensures that when citizens contact their local authority 
their request is resolve to full satisfaction on first contact. Service delivery is 
aimed at enhancing civic life, deepening democratic involvement and 
contributing to more effective neighborhood renewal and sustainable 
communities. A citizen-centered approach to service delivery requires 
government to seek continuously to improve organizational performance in 
delivery of programmes and services, by identifying the appropriate 
organizational arrangement to promote optimal performance.  
Conclusion 
The attempt in this study, have been to reveal the negative impact of 
Nigeria’s protracted economic crisis on the socio-economic well-being of the 
youth. It drew attention to the persistent economic decline that became 
noticeable since the 1980s, as well as the crisis of governance that culminated 
in state failure, poverty, unemployment, corruption, deprivation, and its 
impact on young people in the country. The outcomes created myriad of 
problems for young people, which appeared insurmountable, despite 
government policy initiatives. The observable trend in most youth policy 
initiatives revealed that they were designed with the youth as objects, rather 
than subjects of these initiatives, which leaves them little or no room to get 
actively involve. 
The paper therefore, advocates the need for good governance as a panacea 
these problems. It submitted that the entrenchment of accountability and 
transparency in government, posses the capacity to generate trust and 
reciprocity necessary to forge a viable partnership between the citizens and 
their elected officials. A partnership that is required for translating 
governmental policies into sustainable actions or outcomes. It also, suggested 
the need for active youth participation in the formulation and implementation 
of initiatives that affects them directly, as well as the need to forge viable 
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partnership and collaboration with other stakeholders in the delivery of 
services.  
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